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Does Where You Stand Depend on Where You Sit? Tithing Donations and Self-Serving Beliefs

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  • Michael R. Ransom
  • Gordon B. Dahl

Abstract

Economists and psychologists argue that individuals skew personal beliefs to accord with their own interests. To test for the presence of self-serving beliefs, we surveyed 1,200 members of the Mormon Church about tithing. A tithe is a voluntary contribution equal to 10 percent of income. Since respondents must decide privately what income items to tithe, we observe how the income definition depends on an individual's religious and financial incentives. We find surprisingly little evidence that an individual's financial situation influences beliefs about what counts as income for the tithe. However, ambiguity increases the role for self-serving biases.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael R. Ransom & Gordon B. Dahl, 1999. "Does Where You Stand Depend on Where You Sit? Tithing Donations and Self-Serving Beliefs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 703-727, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:4:p:703-727
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.703
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion

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