Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy
We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.
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- Katarina Elofsson, 2007. "Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(2), pages 143-162, February.
- Beccherle, Julien & Tirole, Jean, 2011.
"Regional initiatives and the cost of delaying binding climate change agreements,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1339-1348.
- Beccherle, Julien & Tirole, Jean, 2010. "Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements," IDEI Working Papers 628, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Wolfgang Buchholz & Kai Konrad, 1994. "Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 299-321, October.
- Konrad, Kai A., 1992. "Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology," EconStor Research Reports 112696, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
- Brandt, Urs Steiner, 2004. "Unilateral actions, the case of international environmental problems," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 373-391, December.
- Urs Steiner Brandt, 2003. "Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems," Working Papers 40/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Hoel, M., 1989. "Global Environmental Problems: The Effects Of Unilateral Actions Taken By One Country," Memorandum 11/1989, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Bård Harstad, 2007. "Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 871-889, June.
- Scott Barret, 1998. "On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 317-333, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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