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Coordination of environmental policy for transboundary environmental problems?

Listed author(s):
  • Hoel, Michael

In order to reach a Pareto optimal outcome with transboundary environmental problems, there must be some kind of international environmental agreement. One possibility is to have an international environmental agreement focusing directly on emissions in each country. Given such an agreement, an important issue is whether one ought to supplement the agreement with some kind of policy coordination, or if the choice of environmental policies should be left to each country to decide on unilaterally. It is shown that the "ideal" conditions, policies need to be coordinated across countries.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047-2727(97)00042-X
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 66 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 199-224

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:66:y:1997:i:2:p:199-224
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. ., 1994. "Environmental Policy," Chapters,in: The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics, chapter 36 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  2. Ulph, A. & Ulph, D., 1994. "Trade, strategic innovation and strategic environmental policy: a general analysis," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9416, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  3. Ralph C. d'Arge, 1975. "On the Economics of Transnational Environmental Externalities," NBER Chapters,in: Economic Analysis of Environmental Problems, pages 397-416 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Ben Lockwood & Alan Manning, 1993. "Wage Setting and the Tax System: theory and Evidence for the UK," CEP Discussion Papers dp0115, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  5. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
  6. Lockwood, Ben & Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, August.
  7. Ulph, Alistair Mitchell & Ulph, David, 1994. "Trade, Strategic Innovation and Strategic Environmental Policy - a General Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 1063, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
  9. Hoel, Michael, 1990. " Local versus Central Wage Bargaining with Endogenous Investments," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(3), pages 453-469.
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