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"Pollution Havens" and the Regulation of Multinationals by Multiple Governments

  • Xiaodong Wu

    (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

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    Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 1766.

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    Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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    Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1766
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    1. Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    2. Bond, Eric W. & Gresik, Thomas A., 1996. "Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-53, January.
    3. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    4. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Bui, Linda T M, 1998. "Gains from Trade and Strategic Interaction: Equilibrium Acid Rain Abatement in the Eastern United States and Canada," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 984-1001, September.
    6. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July.
    7. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
    8. Copeland, Brian R & Taylor, M Scott, 1995. "Trade and Transboundary Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 716-37, September.
    9. Bond, E.W. & Gresik & T.A., 1995. "Competition Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals," Papers 11-95-13, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    10. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995. "Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
    12. Gunnar A. Eskeland & Ann E. Harrison, 2002. "Moving to Greener Pastures? Multinationals and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis," NBER Working Papers 8888, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. David Martimort, 1996. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    14. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    15. Komen, Marinus H.C. & Gerking, Shelby & Folmer, Henk, 1997. "Income and environmental R D: empirical evidence from OECD countries," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(04), pages 505-515, November.
    16. Hoel, Michael, 1997. "Coordination of environmental policy for transboundary environmental problems?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 199-224, November.
    17. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:03 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 1993. "Competition under Nonlinear Pricing," IDEI Working Papers 29, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    19. Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
    20. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    21. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    22. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1985. "Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 269-281, Summer.
    23. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 84-105, Special I.
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