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The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

  • Bréchet, Thierry

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Chair Lhoist Berghmans in Environmental Economics Université catholique de Louvain)

  • Eyckmans, Johan

    ()

    (Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel (HUB), Belgium
    Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium)

  • Gerard, François

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Chair Lhoist Berghmans in Environmental Economics Université catholique de Louvain)

  • Marbaix, Philippe

    (Institut d’Astronomie et de Géophysique Georges Lemaître, Université catholique de Louvain)

  • Tulkens, Henry

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Université catholique de Louvain)

  • van Ypersele, Jean-Pascal

    (Institut d’Astronomie et de Géophysique Georges Lemaître, Université catholique de Louvain)

In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a multilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climateeconomy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitment. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.

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File URL: http://lirias.hubrussel.be/handle/123456789/2243
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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3763/cpol.2009.0643
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Paper provided by Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management in its series Working Papers with number 2008/43.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in Climate Policy, vol. 10, 2010, pp. 148–166
Handle: RePEc:hub:wpecon:200843
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://research.hubrussel.be

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