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Can social externalities solve the small coalitions puzzle in international environmental agreements?

Author

Listed:
  • Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin

    (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Shyama Ramani

    (LORIA - Laboratoire sur les Organisations Industrielles dans l'Agro-Alimentaire - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

A puzzle in the literature on the formation of coalitions supporting International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) is that if an IEA leads to substantial gains, then it will not be supported by many countries. The non-cooperative game theoretic literature highlights the "small coalitions" puzzle by which only a small number of countries are willing to sign an environmental convention. In these models, a global coalition comprising all countries and generating significant benefits is not sustainable. Moreover they indicate that greater the number of countries in the coalition, higher the incentive of signatories to not respect their engagement. The present paper resolves this puzzle by introducing social externalities, in order to explain why some treaties can be sustained by nearly all countries, while others can be supported only by a handful.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Shyama Ramani, 2006. "Can social externalities solve the small coalitions puzzle in international environmental agreements?," Post-Print hal-02661992, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02661992
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    Cited by:

    1. Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia & Georges Zaccour, 2010. "A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(1), pages 25-48, January.

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