Reinterpreting the meaning of breakdown
A typical assumption of the standard alternating-offers model under risk is that the breakdown event means a complete and irrevocable halt in negotiations. We reinterpret the meaning of breakdown as the imposition to finish negotiations immediately. Specifically, after breakdown the last offer becomes definitive. A full characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is provided. We show that Rubinstein's allocation (1/(1+?),?/(1+?)) is obtained under non- stationary strategies. Moreover, the payoffs in delayed equilibria are potentially better for the proposer than those in which agreement is immediately reached.
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