IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v55y1987i6p1331-48.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality

Author

Listed:
  • Kreps, David M
  • Ramey, Garey

Abstract

Sequential equilibria comprise consistent beliefs and a sequentially ra tional strategy profile. Consistent beliefs are limits of Bayes ratio nal beliefs for sequences of strategies that approach the equilibrium strategy. Beliefs are structurally consistent if they are rationaliz ed by some single conjecture concerning opponents' strategies. Consis tent beliefs are not necessarily structurally consistent, notwithstan ding a claim by Kreps and Robert Wilson (1982). Moreover, the spirit of structural consistency conflicts with that of sequential rationali ty. One avoids these difficulties by weakening structural consistency to allow convex combinations of opponents' strategies, but this intr oduces correlation into the strategies that justify out-of-equilibriu m beliefs. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Kreps, David M & Ramey, Garey, 1987. "Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1331-1348, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:6:p:1331-48
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198711%2955%3A6%3C1331%3ASCCASR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2018. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 364-381.
    2. Okada, Akira, 2016. "A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 318-341.
    3. Hillas, John & Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2020. "Backward induction in games without perfect recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 207-218.
    4. Mailath George J. & Samuelson Larry & Swinkels Jeroen M., 1994. "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 325-371, December.
    5. Peter A. Streufert, 2003. "Products of Representations Characterize the Products of Dispersions and the Consistency of Beliefs," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20039, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    6. Ganzach, Yoav, 2018. "Intelligence and the rationality of political preferences," Intelligence, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 59-70.
    7. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 567-592, August.
    8. Feinberg, Yossi, 2005. "Subjective reasoning--solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 94-132, July.
    9. Streufert, Peter A., 2015. "An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 37-46.
    10. Hanjoon Michael Jung, 2020. "Perfect regular equilibrium," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(4), pages 380-398, December.
    11. Giacomo Bonanno, 2009. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision," Working Papers 33, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    12. Igal Milchtaich, 2015. "Polyequilibrium," Working Papers 2015-06, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    13. Kohlberg, Elon & Reny, Philip J., 1997. "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 280-313, August.
    14. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations," Working Papers 302, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    15. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
    16. Giacomo Bonanno, 2009. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision," Working Papers 914, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:6:p:1331-48. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley Content Delivery). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.