Forward induction reasoning revisited
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Schipper, Burkhard C, 2018. "Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness," MPRA Paper 86300, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Battigalli Pierpaolo & Prestipino Andrea, 2013.
"Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-53, May.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Andrea Prestipino, 2011. "Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 376, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Evdokimov, Piotr & Rustichini, Aldo, 2016. "Forward induction: Thinking and behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 195-208.
- Tsakas Elias, 2011. "Hierarchies of conditional beliefs derived from commonly known priors," Research Memorandum 021, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Arieli, Itai & Aumann, Robert J., 2015. "The logic of backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 443-464.
- Tsakas, Elias, 2014. "Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 126-144.
- Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2017.
"Uncertain information structures and backward induction,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 135-151.
- Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2014. "Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2014-79, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Köhlin, Gunnar & Martinsson, Peter & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2016.
"Thanks but no thanks: A new policy to reduce land conflict,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 31-50.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Gunnar Köhlin & Peter Martinsson & Haileselassie Medhin, 2014. "Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict," Working Papers 519, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Gunnar Köhlin & Peter Martinsson & Haileselassie Medhin, 2014. "Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict," CESifo Working Paper Series 4864, CESifo Group Munich.
- Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2013. "The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
- repec:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:489-516 is not listed on IDEAS
- Tsakas Elias, 2012. "Rational belief hierarchies," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
- Amanda Friedenberg & Martin Meier, 2017. "The context of the game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(2), pages 347-386, February.
- Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Dov Samet, 2011. "Strategies and interactive beliefs in dynamic games," Working Papers 375, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
More about this item
KeywordsEpistemic game theory; forward induction; extensive form best response set; directed rationalizability;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:the:publsh:598. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martin J. Osborne). General contact details of provider: http://econtheory.org .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.