Forward induction reasoning revisited

Citations

Cited by:

1. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
   • Schipper, Burkhard C, 2018. "Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness," MPRA Paper 86300, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Burkhard C. Schipper, 2021. "Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 340, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
2. Vi Cao, 2022. "An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 53-85, March.
3. Françoise Forges & József Sákovics, 2022. "Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 589-605, November.
   • J. Sakovics & Françoise Forges, 2022. "Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm," Working Papers hal-03537845, HAL.
4. Quazi Shahriar, 2013. "Forward Induction and Other-regarding Preferences Arising from an Outside Option: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Management and Strategy, Journal of Management and Strategy, Sciedu Press, vol. 4(4), pages 52-57, November.
5. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & De Vito, Nicodemo, 2021. "Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
   • Pierpaolo Battigalli & Nicodemo De Vito, 2018. "Beliefs, Plans, and Perceived Intentions in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 629, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
6. Evdokimov, Piotr & Rustichini, Aldo, 2016. "Forward induction: Thinking and behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 195-208.
7. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi, 2019. "Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 737-763, October.
   • Pierpaolo Battigalli & Gabriele Beneduci & Pietro Tebaldi, 2017. "Interactive Epistemology in Simple Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Strategies," Working Papers 602, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
8. Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2017. "Uncertain information structures and backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 135-151.
   • Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2014. "Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction," IKERLANAK 12097, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
9. Dufwenberg, Martin & Köhlin, Gunnar & Martinsson, Peter & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2016. "Thanks but no thanks: A new policy to reduce land conflict," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 31-50.
   • Martin Dufwenberg & Gunnar Köhlin & Peter Martinsson & Haileselassie Medhin, 2014. "Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict," CESifo Working Paper Series 4864, CESifo.
   • Martin Dufwenberg & Gunnar Köhlin & Peter Martinsson & Haileselassie Medhin, 2014. "Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict," Working Papers 519, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
10. Tsakas, E., 2012. "Rational belief hierarchies," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
11. , & ,, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 27303656, Harvard University Department of Economics.
12. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Dov Samet, 2011. "Strategies and interactive beliefs in dynamic games," Working Papers 375, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
13. Amanda Friedenberg & H. Jerome Keisler, 2021. "Iterated dominance revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 377-421, September.
14. Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2020. "Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 329-367.
    • Burkhard Schipper & Ying Xue Li, 2018. "Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment," Working Papers 111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
15. , & ,, 2013. "The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
16. Burkhard C. Schipper & Hang Zhou, 2022. "Level-k Thinking in the Extensive Form," Working Papers 352, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
17. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Prestipino Andrea, 2013. "Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-53, May.
    • Pierpaolo Battigalli & Andrea Prestipino, 2011. "Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 376, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
18. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
19. Tsakas, E., 2011. "Hierarchies of conditional beliefs derived from commonly known priors," Research Memorandum 021, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
20. Arieli, Itai & Aumann, Robert J., 2015. "The logic of backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 443-464.
    • Itai Arieli & Robert J. Aumann, 2013. "The Logic of Backward Induction," Discussion Paper Series dp652, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
21. Tsakas, Elias, 2014. "Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 126-144.
22. Catonini, Emiliano, 2020. "On non-monotonic strategic reasoning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 209-224.
23. Perea, Andrés, 2017. "Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 489-516.
24. Catonini, Emiliano, 2019. "Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 101-117.
25. Dominiak, Adam & Eichberger, Jürgen, 2021. "Games in context: Equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 125-159.
26. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.