The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
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References listed on IDEAS
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Friedenberg, Amanda, 2012. "Forward induction reasoning revisited," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Arieli, Itai & Aumann, Robert J., 2015. "The logic of backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 443-464.
- Rich, Patricia, 2015. "Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 102-114.
- Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
- Bonanno, Giacomo, 2014. "A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 221-241.
- Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
More about this item
KeywordsExtensive-form rationalizability; dominance; iterative elimination; equivalence;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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