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On the order of eliminating dominated strategies


  • Itzhak Gilboa

    () (Northwestern University [Evanston])

  • E. Kalai
  • E. Zemel


It is known that different orders of eliminating dominated strategies in n-person games may yield different reduced games. One gives conditions which guarantee that the reduced game is unique. For finite games, the conditions include the well-known cases of strict dominance, and in a slightly weaker form, of regular dominance for zero sum and similar games

Suggested Citation

  • Itzhak Gilboa & E. Kalai & E. Zemel, 1990. "On the order of eliminating dominated strategies," Post-Print hal-00481648, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00481648
    DOI: 10.1016/0167-6377(90)90046-8
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dixon, Robert & Mousa, Gehan A. & Woodhead, Anne, 2005. "The Role of Environmental Initiatives in Encouraging Companies to Engage in Environmental Reporting," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 702-716, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yi-Chun & Long, Ngo Van & Luo, Xiao, 2007. "Iterated strict dominance in general games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 299-315, November.
    2. Stahl, Dale O., 1995. "Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 155-159, February.
    3. Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2000. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 324-329, May.
    4. Michael Trost, 2012. "An Epistemic Rationale for Order-Independence," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-010, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    5. Dufwenberg, Martin & Stegeman, Mark, 1999. "When Order matters for Iterated Strict Dominance," Research Papers in Economics 1999:2, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    6. Micali, Silvio & Chen, Jing, 2013. "The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    7. Mamoru Kaneko & Shuige Liu, 2015. "Elimination of dominated strategies and inessential players," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 1, pages 33-54.


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