The complexity of eliminating dominated strategies
This paper deals with the computational complexity of some yes /no problems associated with sequential elimination of strategies using three domination relations: strong domination (strict inequalities), weak domination (weak inequalities), and domination (the asymmetric part of weak domination). Classification of various problems as polynomial or NP-complete seems to suggest that strong domination is a simple notion, whereas weak domination and domination are complicated ones.
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|Date of creation:||Aug 1993|
|Publication status:||Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, 1993, Vol.18, n°3, pp. 553-565. <10.1287/moor.18.3.553>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00481372|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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