Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm
This is a survey of some of the recent decision-theoretic literature involving beliefs that cannot be quantified by a Bayesian prior. We discuss historical, philosophical, and axiomatic foundations of the Bayesian model, as well as of several alternative models recently proposed. The definition and comparison of ambiguity aversion and the updating of non-Bayesian beliefs are briefly discussed. Finally, several applications are mentioned to illustrate the way that ambiguity (or “Knightian uncertainty”) can change the way we think about economic problems.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.igier.unibocconi.it/
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.igier.unibocconi.it/en/papers/index.htm Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon & Klibanoff, Peter & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2000. "Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 35-65, May.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2009. "The Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(03), pages 249-284, November.
- Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Peter Klibanoff & Emre Ozdenoren, 1998. "Maximum Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors," Discussion Papers 1218, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Cerreia-Vioglio, S. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M. & Montrucchio, L., 2011.
"Uncertainty averse preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1275-1330, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:379. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.