Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games
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References listed on IDEAS
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
- Ebbe Groes & Hans JÛrgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1999.
"Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 125-142.
- Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1995. "Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 95-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
- Lehrer, Ehud, 1992. "On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(3), pages 211-226.
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- Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
- Battigalli, P. & Cerreia-Vioglio, S. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M., 2016.
"Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 40-51.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2012. "Analysis of Information Feedback and Selfconfirming Equilibrium," Working Papers 459, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
More about this item
Keywordsadaptive learning; justification operator; imperfect monitoring games;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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