Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games
This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context I relate adaptive learning with a general notion of equilibrium; in particular I provide a dynamic characterization of Conjectural equilibria: a "stable" strategy profile is consistent with adaptive learning if and only if it is a Conjectural equilibrium. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Volume (Year): 2 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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- Ebbe Groes & Hans JÛrgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1999.
"Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 125-142.
- Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1995. "Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 95-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991.
"Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
- Lehrer, Ehud, 1992. "On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(3), pages 211-26.
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