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Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games

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  • Mario Gilli

    (Università Bocconi)

Abstract

This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context I relate adaptive learning with a general notion of equilibrium; in particular I provide a dynamic characterization of Conjectural equilibria: a "stable" strategy profile is consistent with adaptive learning if and only if it is a Conjectural equilibrium. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Gilli, 1999. "Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(2), pages 472-485, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:2:y:1999:i:2:p:472-485
    DOI: 10.1006/redy.1998.0047
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
    2. Ebbe Groes & Hans JÛrgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1999. "Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 125-142.
    3. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
    4. Lehrer, Ehud, 1992. "On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(3), pages 211-226.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Della Lena, Sebastiano & Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2021. "Cultural transmission with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Davide Bordoli, 2023. "Sophisticated Reasoning, Learning, and Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Imperfect Feedback," Working Papers 702, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    3. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
    4. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Panebianco, Fabrizio & Pin, Paolo, 2023. "Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    5. Battigalli, P. & Cerreia-Vioglio, S. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M., 2016. "Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 40-51.
    6. Sebastiano Della Lena & Fabrizio Panebianco, 2019. "Cultural Transmission with Incomplete Information: Parental Perceived Efficacy and Group Misrepresentation," Working Papers 2019:11, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    adaptive learning; justification operator; imperfect monitoring games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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