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Learning with perfect information

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  • Dubey, Pradeep
  • Haimanko, Ori

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  • Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori, 2004. "Learning with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 304-324, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:304-324
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
    2. Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July.
    3. Ebbe Groes & Hans JÛrgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1999. "Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 125-142.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-573, May.
    5. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
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