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Organizational Structure and Pricing: Evidence from a Large U.S. Airline

Author

Listed:
  • Ali Hortacsu

    (University of Chicago and NBER)

  • Olivia R. Natan

    (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Hayden Parsley

    (University of Texas, Austin)

  • Timothy Schwieg

    (University of Chicago, Booth)

  • Kevin R. Williams

    (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

Abstract

Firms often involve multiple departments for critical decisions that may result in coordination failures. Using data from a large U.S. airline, we document the presence of important pricing biases that differ significantly from dynamically optimal profit maximization. However, these biases can be rationalized as a Òsecond-bestÓ after accounting for department decision rights. We show that assuming prices are generated through profit maximization biases demand estimates and that second-best prices can persist, even under improvements to pricing algorithm inputs. Our results suggest caution in abstracting from organizational structure and drawing inferences from firmsÕ pricing decisions alone.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali Hortacsu & Olivia R. Natan & Hayden Parsley & Timothy Schwieg & Kevin R. Williams, 2021. "Organizational Structure and Pricing: Evidence from a Large U.S. Airline," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2312R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2312r2
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    Cited by:

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    2. Günter J. Hitsch & Sanjog Misra & Walter W. Zhang, 2024. "Heterogeneous treatment effects and optimal targeting policy evaluation," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 115-168, June.
    3. Victor Aguirregabiria & Francis Guiton, 2022. "Decentralized Decision-Making in Retail Chains: Evidence from Inventory Management," Working Papers tecipa-722, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    4. Ali Hortacsu & Olivia R. Natan & Hayden Parsley & Timothy Schwieg & Kevin R. Williams, 2021. "Incorporating Search and Sales Information in Demand Estimation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2313, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Robert Evan Sanders, 2024. "Dynamic Pricing and Organic Waste Bans: A Study of Grocery Retailers’ Incentives to Reduce Food Waste," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(2), pages 289-316, March.
    6. James D. Dana Jr. & Kevin R. Williams, 2018. "This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show the existence of multiple sales opportunities creates strong competitive forces that prevent firms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2136R4, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2021.
    7. James D. Dana & Kevin R. Williams, 2022. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(5), pages 966-981, September.
    8. Michele Fioretti & Junnan He & Jorge Tamayo, 2024. "Prices and Concentration: A U-Shape? Theory and Evidence from Renewables," Working Papers hal-04631762, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
    • C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation

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