A Limit Theorem for Equilibria under Ambiguous Beliefs Correspondences
Previous literature shows that, in many different models, limits of equilibria of perturbed games are equilibria of the unperturbed game when the sequence of perturbed games converges to the unperturbed one in an appropriate sense. The question whether such limit property extends to the equilibrium notions in ambiguous games is not yet clear as it seems; in fact, previous literature shows that the extension fails in simple examples. The contribution in this paper is to show that the limit property holds for equilibria under ambiguous beliefs correspondences (presented by the authors in a previous paper). Key for our result is the sequential convergence assumption imposed on the sequence of beliefs correspondences. Counterexamples show why this assumption cannot be removed.
|Date of creation:||28 Nov 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, Vol. 66(3), pp. 431–438|
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