IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v63y2007i3p497-513.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift

Author

Listed:
  • Uriarte, Jose Ramon

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Uriarte, Jose Ramon, 2007. "A behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 497-513, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:63:y:2007:i:3:p:497-513
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(06)00089-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Binmore, Ken & McCarthy, John & Ponti, Giovanni & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 2002. "A Backward Induction Experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 48-88, May.
    2. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 161-169, October.
    3. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    5. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
    6. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November.
    7. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1998. "A comparison of learning and replicator dynamics using experimental data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 263-280, April.
    8. Ed Hopkins, 2002. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2141-2166, November.
    9. Yun Joo Jung & John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1994. "On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 72-93, Spring.
    10. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-1095, December.
    11. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    12. Cabrales, Antonio, 2000. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 451-481, May.
    13. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "Similarity and decision-making under risk (is there a utility theory resolution to the Allais paradox?)," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 145-153, October.
    14. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
    15. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    16. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    17. Schotter Andrew & Weigelt Keith & Wilson Charles, 1994. "A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 445-468, May.
    18. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June.
    19. JosÊ RamÕn Uriarte, 1999. "Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(1), pages 1-12.
    20. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
    21. Abbink, Klaus & Bolton, Gary E. & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Tang, Fang-Fang, 2001. "Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-25, October.
    22. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift And Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 049, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    23. Aizpurua, J M & Ichiishi, T. & Nieto, J. & Uriarte, J. R., 1993. "Similarity and Preferences in the Space of Simple Lotteries," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 289-297, June.
    24. H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
    25. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    26. Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692198, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Iriberri Etxebeste, Nagore & Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón, 2006. "The Language Game: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Language Contact," IKERLANAK 6232, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    2. Juan Carlos Bárcena‐Ruiz & Máximo Sedano, 2011. "Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly: Weighted Welfare And Price Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 485-503, December.
    3. Antonio Cabrales & José-Ramón Uriarte, 2013. "Doubts and equilibria," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 783-810, September.
    4. Iriberri Etxebeste, Nagore & Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón, 2011. "Minority Language and the Stability of Bilingual Equilibria," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón, 2005. "A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift," IKERLANAK 2005-19, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    2. Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón, 2005. "A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift," IKERLANAK 6488, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    3. Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón, 2003. "A Model of Evolutionay Drift," IKERLANAK 6502, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    4. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    5. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Continuous-time evolutionary dynamics: theory and practice," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 187-214, June.
    6. Antonio Cabrales & José-Ramón Uriarte, 2013. "Doubts and equilibria," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 783-810, September.
    7. Cabrales, Antonio & Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón, 2008. "Doubts and Equilibria," IKERLANAK 2008-31, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    8. Sandholm, William H., 2003. "Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 343-378, August.
    9. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 115-141, January.
    10. Ianni, A., 2002. "Reinforcement learning and the power law of practice: some analytical results," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 203, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    11. Yi, Kang-Oh, 2005. "Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 324-348, May.
    12. Ed Hopkins, 2002. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2141-2166, November.
    13. Battalio,R. & Samuelson,L. & Huyck,J. van, 1998. "Risk dominance, payoff dominance and probabilistic choice learning," Working papers 2, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    14. Bosch-Domenech, Antoni & Saez-Marti, Maria, 2001. "Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 105-137, August.
    15. Dai, Darong, 2012. "Learning Nash Equilibria," MPRA Paper 40040, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
    17. Dai, Darong, 2012. "On the Existence and Stability of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching with Fairness," MPRA Paper 40560, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 320-366, April.
    19. Halevy, Yoram & Peters, Michael, 2007. "Other Regarding Preferences: Outcomes, Intentions, or Interdependence," Microeconomics.ca working papers peters-07-03-31-11-46-48, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 24 Jun 2009.
    20. William Tracy, 2014. "Paradox Lost: The Evolution of Strategies in Selten’s Chain Store Game," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 43(1), pages 83-103, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:63:y:2007:i:3:p:497-513. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.