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Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property

  • Ulrich Berger

    (Vienna University of Economics)

Fictitious play is the oldest and most studied learning process for games. Since the already classical result for zero-sum games, convergence of beliefs to the set of Nash equilibria has been established for some important classes of games, including weighted potential games, supermodular games with diminishing returns, and 3x3 supermodular games. Extending these results, we establish convergence for ordinal potential games and quasi-supermodular games with diminishing returns. As a by-product we obtain convergence for 3xm and 4x4 quasi-supermodular games.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0408/0408003.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0408003.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 31 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0408003
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 17
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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  1. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
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  8. Vives, X., 1988. "Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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  17. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
  18. A. Gaunersdorfer & J. Hofbauer, 2010. "Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons and the Replicator Equation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 438, David K. Levine.
  19. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  20. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
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  25. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Continuous Fictitious Play via Projective Geometry," Game Theory and Information 0303004, EconWPA.
  26. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:22:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
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