Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputations with Long Run Players," 2009 Meeting Papers 220, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
- Sorin Sylvain, 1995. "A Note on Repeated Extensive Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 116-123, April.
- Quan Wen, 2002. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 493-512.
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- Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
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