Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric?
Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed discount factor close to one there is an open neighborhood of games which contains a pure coordination game such that every Perfect equilibrium of every game in the neighborhood approximates to an arbitrary degree the unique Pareto dominant payoff of the pure coordination game.
Volume (Year): 6 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988.
"A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs,"
Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-69, May.
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- Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, . ""An 'Anti-Folk Theorem' for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games''," CARESS Working Papres 95-15, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
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