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Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game

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  • Pesce, Marialaura
  • Yannelis, Nicholas C.

Abstract

We introduce the notions of ex-ante and interim minimax point for an asymmetric information game and prove the existence of such points. Our new results include as a special case the theorem in (Aliprantis et al., 2009).

Suggested Citation

  • Pesce, Marialaura & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2010. "Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 4-6, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:1:p:4-6
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    1. Pesce, Marialaura & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2010. "Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 4-6, July.
    2. Aliprantis, C.D. & Chakrabarti, S.K. & Topolyan, I., 2009. "A proof of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 261-263, December.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
    4. Thomas, J. P., 1995. "Subgame-perfect attainment of minimax punishments in discounted two-person games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-4, January.
    5. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(2), pages 183-197, April.
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    1. Pesce, Marialaura & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2010. "Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 4-6, July.

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