Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
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- D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin., 1987. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8736, University of California at Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains," Working papers 499, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007.
"Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2051, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Scholarly Articles 3196336, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Salonen, Hannu & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2008. "Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 595-598, June.
- Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Valuating Payoff Streams under Unequal Discount Factors," Discussion Papers 16, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Thomas, J. P., 1995. "Subgame-perfect attainment of minimax punishments in discounted two-person games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-4, January.
- Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 335-355.
- Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," Discussion Papers 858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2016. "How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 332-359.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi, 2016. "How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2029, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2017. "How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games?," TSE Working Papers 17-792, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2004. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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