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Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests

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  • Schmidt, K.M.

Abstract

A two-person game is of conflicting interests if the strategy to which player one would most like to commit herself holds player two down to his minimax payoff. Suppose there is a positive prior probability that player one is a "commitme nt type" who will always play this strategy. Then player one will get a t least her commitment payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game if her discount factor approaches one. This result is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure and in striking contrast to the message of the Folk theorem for games with incomplete information. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidt, K.M., 1992. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests," Working papers 92-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:92-7
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    1. Halpern, Janice & Hausman, Jerry A., 1986. "Choice under uncertainty: A model of applications for the social security disability insurance program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 131-161, November.
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    4. Gustman, Alan L & Steinmeier, Thomas L, 1985. "The 1983 Social Security Reforms and Labor Supply Adjustments of Older Individuals in the Long Run," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(2), pages 237-253, April.
    5. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
    6. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1986. " Payroll-Tax Financed Social Insurance with Variable Retirement," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(1), pages 25-50.
    7. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December.
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