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Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests

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  1. Angus Holford, 2015. "The labour supply effect of Education Maintenance Allowance and its implications for parental altruism," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 531-568, September.
  2. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2005. "The Influence of Information Externalities on the Value of Reputation Building - An Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 17, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  3. Chantal Marlats, 2021. "Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 1-31, February.
  4. Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
  5. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.
  6. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 6, pages 95-120, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  7. Pio Baake & Vanessa Schlippenbach, 2011. "Quality distortions in vertical relations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 149-169, June.
  8. Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
  9. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi, 2019. "Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 737-763, October.
  10. Rainer Nitsche, 2000. "Incentives to Grow: Multimarket Firms and Predation," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-19, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  11. Peter Burton & Shelley Phipps & Lori Curtis, 2002. "All in the Family: A Simultaneous Model of Parenting Style and Child Conduct," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 368-372, May.
  12. Brainard, S. Lael & Martimort, David, 1997. "Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 33-65, February.
  13. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
  14. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
  15. Cripps, Martin W. & Dekel, Eddie & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2005. "Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 259-272, April.
  16. Ilukor, John & Birner, Regina, 2013. "Veterinarians, Paraprofessionals, Farmers and the Quality of Clinical Veterinary Services: A role play experiment," 2013 Fourth International Conference, September 22-25, 2013, Hammamet, Tunisia 160476, African Association of Agricultural Economists (AAAE).
  17. Celentani, Marco & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "Reputation in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 109-132, July.
  18. Shota Fujishima, 2015. "The emergence of cooperation through leadership," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 17-36, February.
  19. Yunjian Xu & Katrina Ligett, 2018. "Commitment in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(2), pages 449-489, August.
  20. Peter Burton & Shelley Phipps & Lori Curtis, 2002. "All in the Family: A Simultaneous Model of Parenting Style and Child Conduct," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 368-372, May.
  21. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2007. "Information Value and Externalities in Reputation Building - An Experimental Study," Working Paper Series in Economics 35, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2008.
  22. Hausken, Kjell, 2007. "Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 138-144, November.
  23. Ilukor, John & Birner, Regina, 2015. "Do Veterinary Paraprofessionals Provide Quality Clinical Veterinary Services for Cattle? Results from a Role Play Experiment in Rural Uganda," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 211781, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  24. Bolton, Gary E. & Ockenfels, Axel & Ebeling, Felix, 2011. "Information value and externalities in reputation building," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 23-33, January.
  25. David Hugh-Jones & Ro’i Zultan, 2013. "Reputation and Cooperation in Defense," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(2), pages 327-355, April.
  26. Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1997. "Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-158, February.
  27. Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2021. "Reputation for Toughness," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-16, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  28. Calabuig, Vicente & Olcina, Gonzalo, 2000. "Commitment and strikes in wage bargaining," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 349-372, May.
  29. Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2015, David K. Levine.
  30. Colombo, Emilio & Tirelli, Patrizio & Visser, Jelle, 2014. "Reinterpreting social pacts: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 358-374.
  31. Lu, Yang K., 2013. "Optimal policy with credibility concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2007-2032.
  32. Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
  33. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  34. Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  35. Sandroni, Alvaro, 2000. "Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 157-182, August.
  36. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  37. Coates, Daniel E. & Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "A theory of trade policy leadership," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 1-29, June.
  38. Fong, Yuk-fai & Surti, Jay, 2009. "The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 277-291, September.
  39. Miriam Schütte & Philipp Christoph Wichardt, 2013. "Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4193, CESifo.
  40. Harish Guda & Milind Dawande & Ganesh Janakiraman, 2021. "“Seemingly‐Beneficial” Interventions," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(10), pages 3337-3353, October.
  41. Holford, Angus, 2016. "Do parents tax their children? Teenage labour supply and financial support," ISER Working Paper Series 2016-05, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
  42. Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  43. Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "Maintaining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 9, pages 163-176, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  44. Travis L. Johnson & Nathan Swem, 2017. "Reputation and Investor Activism: A Structural Approach," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-036r1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 15 Oct 2020.
  45. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics.
  46. Coates, Daniel E. & Ludema, Rodney D., 1995. "Unilateral tariff reduction as leadership in the political economy of trade negotiations," Discussion Papers, Series II 276, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
  47. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
  48. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
  49. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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