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Do Veterinary Paraprofessionals Provide Quality Clinical Veterinary Services for Cattle? Results from a Role Play Experiment in Rural Uganda

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  • Ilukor, John
  • Birner, Regina

Abstract

The study uses a role play experiment to analyze how the interaction of farmers and service providers influences the quality and the demand for clinical services. The game was played in four rounds, and the quality of clinical services was measured by scoring the accuracy of a service provider prescribing the appropriate drug for selected animal diseases. The results show that the accuracy of prescriptions by veterinarians is not significantly different from that of paraprofessionals trained in veterinary science. However, the ability of service providers who are not trained in veterinary medicine is significantly lower than that of service providers trained in veterinary science. The continued interaction between paraprofessionals and veterinarians gradually leads to an improvement in the ability of paraprofessionals not trained in veterinary sciences to perform correct diagnosis and drug prescription. However, farmers’ inability to punish poor quality service providers limits interaction between paraprofessionals and veterinarians.

Suggested Citation

  • Ilukor, John & Birner, Regina, 2015. "Do Veterinary Paraprofessionals Provide Quality Clinical Veterinary Services for Cattle? Results from a Role Play Experiment in Rural Uganda," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 211781, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae15:211781
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.211781
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Livestock Production/Industries;

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