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Games without Rules


  • Menezes, Flavio
  • Quiggin, John


We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2004. "Games without Rules," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151166, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:uqsers:151166

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Menezes, Flavio M. & Quiggin, John, 2010. "Markets for influence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 307-310, May.
    2. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2007. "Can Game Theory be Saved," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151181, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
    3. Menezes, Flavio M. & Quiggin, John, 2012. "More competitors or more competition? Market concentration and the intensity of competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 712-714.
    4. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2013. "Inferring the strategy space from market outcomes," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151206, University of Queensland, School of Economics.

    More about this item


    game theory; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C71;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games


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