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Markets for Influence

Author

Listed:
  • Flavio Menezes

    (Australian National University)

  • John Quiggin

    (Risk & Sustainable Management Group, School of Economics, University of Queensland)

Abstract

We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence.Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation.

Suggested Citation

  • Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2007. "Markets for Influence," Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers WP7R07, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland.
    • Handle: RePEc:rsm:riskun:r07_7
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    File URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/WP/WPR07_7.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paulo Brito & Bipasa Datta & Huw Dixon, 2011. "The evolution of mixed conjectures in the rent-extraction game," Discussion Papers 11/06, Department of Economics, University of York.
    2. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, "undated". "Inferring the strategy space from market outcomes," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151206, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
    3. Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Nicolas Treich, 2017. "Risky rents," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 151-164, October.
    4. Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013. "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
    5. Walter Ferrarese, 2018. "Equilibrium Effort in Games with Homogeneous Production Functions and Homogeneous Valuation," CEIS Research Paper 432, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 12 Nov 2021.
    6. Menezes, Flavio M. & Quiggin, John, 2012. "More competitors or more competition? Market concentration and the intensity of competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 712-714.
    7. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contest success functions: the common-pool perspective," ECON - Working Papers 195, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    8. A. Aiche & E. Einy & O. Haimanko & D. Moreno & A. Sela & B. Shitovitz, 2019. "Information in Tullock contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 303-323, May.
    9. Robertson, Matthew J., 2025. "Competitive outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 250(C).
    10. Cortney Rodet & Andrew Smyth, 2018. "Experimental Evidence on the Cyclicality of Investment," Working Papers 18-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    11. Murray, Cameron K., 2012. "Markets in political influence: rent-seeking, networks and groups," MPRA Paper 42070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Cortney S. Rodet & Andrew Smyth, 2020. "Competitive blind spots and the cyclicality of investment: Experimental evidence," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(1), pages 274-315, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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