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Games without Rules

  • Flavio Menezes

    ()

  • John Quiggin

    ()

We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-007-9042-6
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 63 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 315-347

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:63:y:2007:i:4:p:315-347
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

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  1. Paul Klemperer & Ken Binmore, 2001. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," Economics Series Working Papers 2002-W04, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  3. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
  6. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521589819 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Paul Klemperer, 2001. "How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Papers 2002-W5, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Nov 2001.
  8. Marco A. Haan & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2003. "Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 215-235, 07.
  9. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
  10. Konrad, Kai A, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 155-65, April.
  11. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521589833 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  13. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November.
  14. Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1994. "Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 245-251, June.
  15. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999. "Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof Via Contraction," Staff General Research Papers 1630, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  16. Gil S. Epstein & Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Lobbying contests with alternative instruments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 81-89, 04.
  17. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521589826 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  19. Haan, Marco & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2001. "Rent seeking with efforts and bids," CCSO Working Papers 200113, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
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