Outcomes and Strategy Choices in Tullock Contests
We explore the relationship between the choice of the strategy space and outcomes in Tullock contests. In particular, in a framework where one of the contest's participants moves first, we show that there is an equilibrium where this individual wins the contest with probability one. We also show that not only the nature of the outcome changes (e.g., who wins the contest) with the choice of the strategy space but also that a contest organiser might have preferences over this space. We argue that ultimately the analyst does not have complete freedom to choose the strategy space. Instead, he or she should consider the strategies that are permitted by the organisers of a formal contest, whose interests might lie in maximising returns. That is, the analyst's choice of the strategy space is not neutral.
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- Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1994. "Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 245-251, June.
- Haan, Marco & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2001. "Rent seeking with efforts and bids," CCSO Working Papers 200113, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
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