IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Outcomes and Strategy Choices in Tullock Contests


  • Flavio Menezes

    () (Australian National University)

  • John Quiggin

    () (Department of Economics, University of Queensland)


We explore the relationship between the choice of the strategy space and outcomes in Tullock contests. In particular, in a framework where one of the contest's participants moves first, we show that there is an equilibrium where this individual wins the contest with probability one. We also show that not only the nature of the outcome changes (e.g., who wins the contest) with the choice of the strategy space but also that a contest organiser might have preferences over this space. We argue that ultimately the analyst does not have complete freedom to choose the strategy space. Instead, he or she should consider the strategies that are permitted by the organisers of a formal contest, whose interests might lie in maximising returns. That is, the analyst's choice of the strategy space is not neutral.

Suggested Citation

  • Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2005. "Outcomes and Strategy Choices in Tullock Contests," Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers WP6R05, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland.
  • Handle: RePEc:rsm:riskun:r05_6

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Marco A. Haan & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2003. "Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 215-235, July.
    2. Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1994. "Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 245-251, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Strategy space; Tullock contests;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rsm:riskun:r05_6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Adamson). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.