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Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists

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  • Grant, Simon
  • Quiggin, John

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  • Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1994. "Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 245-251, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:45:y:1994:i:2:p:245-251
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    Cited by:

    1. Denis Claude & Mabel Tidball, 2022. "Taking firms’ margin targets seriously in a model of competition in supply functions," Working Papers hal-03548797, HAL.
    2. Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2005. "Outcomes and Strategy Choices in Tullock Contests," Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers WP6R05, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland.
    3. Newbery, David M. & Greve, Thomas, 2017. "The strategic robustness of oligopoly electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 124-132.
    4. Boone, Jan & Müller, Wieland, 2012. "The distribution of harm in price-fixing cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 265-276.
    5. Boone, Jan, 2002. "'Be Nice, Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3342, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Menezes, Flavio M. & Quiggin, John, 2010. "Markets for influence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 307-310, May.
    7. David M. Newbery & Thomas Greve, 2013. "The Strategic Robustness of Mark-up Equilibria," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1341, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Boone, J., 2002. "'Be Nice Unless it Pays to Fight' : A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," Other publications TiSEM 739723a0-ffec-49c9-bef8-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Irmen, Andreas, 1997. "Mark-up pricing and bilateral monopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 179-184, February.
    10. Kelemen, József, 2020. "Szimultán Hotelling-modell Cobb-Douglas-hasznosságfüggvénnyel [A simultaneous Hotelling model with a Cobb-Douglas utility function]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 14-30.
    11. David M. Newbery & Thomas P. Greve, 2015. "The robustness of industrial commodity oligopoly pricing strategies," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1540, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Bulut, Harun & Koray, Semih, 2008. "Competition and Regulation via Supply and Demand Functions in Oligopolistic-Oligopsonistic Markets," Working Papers 6136, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    13. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2007. "Can Game Theory be Saved," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151181, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
    14. Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2007. "Games without Rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 315-347, December.
    15. Yassine Badra & Damien Gaumont, 2020. "Pricing goods for retailers: A new approach," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(8), pages 1493-1500, December.
    16. Markus Pasche, 2002. "Heterogeneous Behavioral Rules in the Oligopolistic Case," Working Paper Series B 2002-01, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration.
    17. Newberry, D., 2012. "The roubstness of agent-based models of electricity wholesale markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1228, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    18. Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1998. "The meeting place problem: Salience and search," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 271-283, January.

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