Mark-Up Pricing and Bilateral Monopoly
It is an empirically established fact that managers use cost based percentage margins when they price their goods. As a consequence, percentage mark-ups should be determined as equilibrium choices. This paper incorporates this empirical observation into the analysis of competition among bilateral monopolists.
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|Date of creation:||Oct 1996|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Letters, vol.54, 1977, pp. 179-184|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne|
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.20
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
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- Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1994. "Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 245-251, June.
- Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 1994.
"Percentage Retail Mark-Ups,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
9412, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Hugo Sonnenschein, 1968. "The Dual of Duopoly Is Complementary Monopoly: or, Two of Cournot's Theories Are One," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 316-316.
- Young, Allan Richard, 1991. "Vertical Structure and Nash Equilibrium: A Note," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 717-722, December.
- Michael Waterson, 1980. "Price-Cost Margins and Successive Market Power," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 135-150.
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