Mark-up pricing and bilateral monopoly
It is an empirically established fact that managers use cost based percentage margins when they price their goods. As a consequence, percentage mark-ups should be determined as equilibrium choices. This paper incorporates this empirical observation into the analysis of competition among bilateral monopolists.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Young, Allan Richard, 1991. "Vertical Structure and Nash Equilibrium: A Note," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 717-722, December.
- Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1994. "Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 245-251, June.
- Hugo Sonnenschein, 1968. "The Dual of Duopoly Is Complementary Monopoly: or, Two of Cournot's Theories Are One," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 316-316.
- Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 1999.
"Percentage Retail Mark-Ups,"
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES),
Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 135(IV), pages 539-557, December.
- Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 1994. "Percentage Retail Mark-Ups," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9412, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Michael Waterson, 1980. "Price-Cost Margins and Successive Market Power," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 135-150.
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