Mark-up pricing and bilateral monopoly
It is an empirically established fact that managers use cost based percentage margins when they price their goods. As a consequence, percentage mark-ups should be determined as equilibrium choices. This paper incorporates this empirical observation into the analysis of competition among bilateral monopolists.
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