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Resale price maintenance post Leegin: A model of rpm incentives

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Listed:
  • Comanor, William
  • salant, david j

Abstract

The prominent Babies R Us decision (McDonough et al., v. Toys R US, Inc., 2009) was the first to explore the economic consequences of resale price maintenance after the Supreme Court’s Leegin Decision. Previously, litigation concerned the presence or absence of an agreement; but that changed with the new jurisprudence which instead emphasized the restraint’s direct anti-competitive effects. While the district court’s decision in the Babies R Us case rested on the factual circumstances of the case, it did not have before it an economic model through which those facts could be integrated. This paper offers such a mode, the predicates of which are drawn from the case. The conclusions that are drawn from the model are fully consistent with the court’s decision

Suggested Citation

  • Comanor, William & salant, david j, 2016. "Resale price maintenance post Leegin: A model of rpm incentives," MPRA Paper 75574, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:75574
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2014. "Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 672-686, February.
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    3. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
    4. Michael Waterson, 1980. "Price-Cost Margins and Successive Market Power," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(1), pages 135-150.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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