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Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors

Author

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  • William Comanor
  • Patrick Rey

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • William Comanor & Patrick Rey, 2000. "Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 17(2), pages 135-153, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:17:y:2000:i:2:p:135-153
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1007857709649
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Rey, Patrick & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1988. "Vertical restraints and producers' competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 561-568, March.
    3. repec:bin:bpeajo:v:21:y:1990:i:1990-3:p:205-286 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-1145, December.
    5. Katz, Michael L., 1989. "Vertical contractual relations," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 655-721 Elsevier.
    6. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "The Logic of Vertical Restraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 921-939, December.
    7. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
    8. Dennis E. Smallwood & John Conlisk, 1979. "Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 1-23.
    9. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
    10. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    11. Miklós-Thal, Jeanine & Rey, Patrick & Vergé, Thibaud, 2010. "Vertical relations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 345-349, July.
    12. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    13. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-230, March.
    14. Innes, Robert & Sexton, Richard J, 1994. "Strategic Buyers and Exclusionary Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 566-584, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nigel Driffield & Max Munday & Annette Roberts, 2002. "Foreign Direct Investment, Transactions Linkages, and the Performance of the Domestic Sector," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 335-351.
    2. John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2012. "Vertical Practices Facilitating Exclusion," Working Papers 12-20, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    3. Bakó, Barna & Kálecz-Simon, András, 2012. "Vertikális korlátozások - növelik vagy csökkentik a jólétet?. Érvek az irodalomból
      [Vertical constraints - do they increase or reduce welfare?. Arguments in the literature]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1138-1159.
    4. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
    5. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2013. "How Does Downstream Firms' Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?," ISER Discussion Paper 0878r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2015.
    6. John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2010. "Exclusionary Minimum Resale Price Maintenance," NBER Working Papers 16564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Dubois, Pierre & Jullien, Bruno, 2016. "Product design and decision rights in vertical structures," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 558-568.
    8. Adam D. Rennhoff, 2004. "Paying For Shelf Space: An Investigation Of Merchandising Allowances In The Grocery Industry," Food Marketing Policy Center Research Reports 084, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
    9. Rennhoff, Adam D., 2004. "Paying For Shelf Space: An Investigation Of Merchandising Allowances In The Grocery Industry," Research Reports 25155, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
    10. William S. Comanor & David Salant, 2017. "Resale Price Maintenance Post Leegin: A Model of RPM Incentives," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(2), pages 169-179, March.
    11. Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, 2007. "Resale price maintenance and collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 983-1001, December.
    12. repec:dpr:wpaper:0878 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Fabian Bergès & Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache, 2012. "Is producing a private label counterproductive for a branded manufacturer?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 39(2), pages 213-239, April.

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