'Consumer' versus 'Customer': the Devil in the Detail
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More about this item
Keywords
Article 82EC; abuse of dominance; consumer welfare; customer welfare; final consumers; intermediate customers;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
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