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The Chicago School, Transaction Cost Economics, and Antitrust

In: The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics

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  • Joshua D. Wright

Abstract

Since its emergence in the 1970s, transaction cost economics (TCE) has become a leading approach in the research on contracts, firm organization and strategy, antitrust, marketing, inter-firm collaboration and entrepreneurship. With contributions by leading scholars in economics, law and business administration – including Oliver E. Williamson, recipient of the 2009 Nobel Prize in economics for his development of the transaction cost approach – this volume reviews the latest developments in TCE and applies them to contemporary theoretical and empirical problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua D. Wright, 2010. "The Chicago School, Transaction Cost Economics, and Antitrust," Chapters,in: The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 23 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:4136_23
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Klein, Benjamin & Saft, Lester F, 1985. "The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 345-361, May.
    2. Peltzman, Sam, 2005. "Aaron Director's Influence on Antitrust Policy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 313-330, October.
    3. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February.
    4. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
    5. Einer Elhauge, 2007. "Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
    6. Paul L. Joskow, 2002. "Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 95-116, April.
    7. Klein, Benjamin, 1980. "Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(2), pages 356-362, May.
    8. repec:oup:jcomle:v:1:y:2005:i:4:p:707-746. is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, 1998. "The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(1), pages 57-84, April.
    10. Klein, Benjamin & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988. "Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 265-297, October.
    11. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2000. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
    12. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-859, September.
    13. repec:mes:jeciss:v:30:y:1996:i:4:p:1212-1216 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Williamson, Oliver E, 1971. "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 112-123, May.
    15. John Simpson & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2007. "Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1305-1320, September.
    16. Klein, Benjamin, 2000. "Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 105-141, April.
    17. Klein, Benjamin & Murphy, Kevin M, 1997. "Vertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 415-420, May.
    18. Marvel, Howard P, 1982. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, April.
    19. Joshua Wright, 2007. "The Roberts Court and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
    20. Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, 2007. "The Economics of Slotting Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 421-454.
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