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The Impact of Upfront Payments on Assortment Decisions in Retailing

  • Pio Baake

    ()

  • Vanessa Schlippenbach

    ()

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    There is a contentious debate about the exclusionary effects of upfront payments to be made by manufacturers to place their products on retailers’ shelves. Analyzing a two-stage bargaining process with one downstream retailer and a pool of upstream manufacturers, we find that upfront payments lead to a smaller assortment if the retailer’s bargaining power is high enough and the suppliers’ products are close substitutes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-013-9407-7
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

    Volume (Year): 44 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 1 (February)
    Pages: 95-111

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:44:y:2014:i:1:p:95-111
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