Naked Slotting Fees for Vertical Control of Multi-Product Retail Markets
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- Innes, Robert & Hamilton, Stephen F., 2006. "Naked slotting fees for vertical control of multi-product retail markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 303-318, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 2011. "The iPhone goes downstream: mandatory universal distribution," CUDARE Working Papers 123636, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa Schlippenbach, 2013.
"One-Stop Shopping as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting Mechanism,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 468-487, September.
- Caprice, Stéphane & von Schlippenbach, Vanessa, 2013. "One-stop shopping as a cause of slotting fees: A rent-shifting mechanism," DICE Discussion Papers 97, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Yaron Yehezkel, 2014. "Motivating a Supplier to Test Product Quality," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 309-345, June.
- Hamilton, Stephen F. & Bontems, Philippe & Lepore, Jason, 2015.
"Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 49-59.
- Stephen Hamilton & Philippe Bontems & Jason Lepore, 2015. "Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct," Post-Print hal-01183029, HAL.
- Robert Innes & Stephen F. Hamilton, 2009. "Vertical restraints and horizontal control," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 120-143.
- Bontems, Philippe & Dhar, Tirtha & Chavas, Jean- Paul, 2007. "Role of Bargaining in Marketing Channel Games of Quality Choice and Profit Share," Working Papers 201521, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Food System Research Group.
- repec:eee:ecolet:v:158:y:2017:i:c:p:34-36 is not listed on IDEAS
- Karp, Larry & Perloff, Jeffrey, 2011. "The iPhone Goes Downstream: Mandatory Universal Distributionâˆ—," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7vc007jh, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Hamilton, Stephen & Innes, Robert, 2017.
"Slotting allowances and retail product variety under oligopoly,"
Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 34-36.
- Innes, Robert & Hamilton, Stephen F., 2010. "Slotting Allowances and Retail Product Variety under Oligopoly," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 60948, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Roman Inderst & Greg Shaffer, 2010. "Market-share contracts as facilitating practices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(4), pages 709-729.
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KeywordsFood Security and Poverty; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods;
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