Vertical Contracts and Mandatory Universal Distribution
An upstream monopoly that provides a new good to a downstream oligopoly might prefer to sell to a single rather than to multiple downstream firms. For example, Apple initially sold its iPhone through one vendor. If a monopoly uses a single vendor, the government may impose a mandatory universal distribution (MUD) requirement that forces the monopoly to sell to all downstream vendors. However, if the income elasticity of demand for the new good is greater than the income elasticity of the existing generic good, the MUD requirement leads to a higher equilibrium price for both the new good and the generic and lowers consumer welfare.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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