Multilateral Vertical Contracting with an Alternative Supply: The Welfare Effects of a Ban on Price Discrimination
Rey and Tirole [Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: Elsevier (2005)] considered a model in which a monopolist sells to downstream firms using nonlinear contracts. They showed that banning price discrimination fully restores the supplier’s ability to leverage its monopoly power by enabling it to commit not to offer side discounts. I show that the situation changes when the supplier competes against a fringe of less efficient rivals rather than being a monopolist. Then banning price discrimination may cause per-unit prices to fall and welfare to increase. The dominant supplier can take advantage of a strategic bargaining effect: reducing the per-unit price makes the outside option of buying from the fringe less profitable, allowing the dominant supplier to extract more bargaining surplus through the fixed fee. Copyright Springer 2006
Volume (Year): 28 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Avenel, E. & Caprice, S., 2006. "Upstream market power and product line differentiation in retailing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 319-334, March.
- Patrick Rey & Jeanine Thal & Thibaud Vergé, 2006. "Slotting Allowances and Conditional Payments," Working Papers 2006-23, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
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