The balance of power between producers and retailers : a differentiation model
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- Marie-Laure Allain, 2002. "The Balance of Power between Producers and Retailers ; a Differentiation model," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 68(3), pages 359-370.
- Marie-Laure Allain, 1999. "The Balance of Power Between Producers and Retailers : A Differentiation Model," Working Papers 99-17, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn.
- Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, 1988. ""Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 221-234, Summer.
- Katz, Michael L., 1989. "Vertical contractual relations," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 655-721 Elsevier.
- Greg Shaffer, 1991. "Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 120-135, Spring.
- Mills, David E, 1995. "Why Retailers Sell Private Labels," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 509-528, Fall.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Fabian Bergès & Claire Chambolle, 2009.
"Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain,
De Boeck Université, vol. 75(3), pages 353-368.
- Bergès, Fabian & Chambolle, Claire, 2007. "Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power," IDEI Working Papers 471, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Fabian Bergès & Claire Chambolle, 2009. "Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2009033, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Vanessa von Schlippenbach & Isabel Teichmann, 2012.
"The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1189-1201.
- Teichmann, Isabel & von Schlippenbach, Vanessa, 2011. "The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 116079, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- von Schlippenbach, Vanessa & Teichmann, Isabel, 2012. "The strategic use of private quality standards in food supply chains," DICE Discussion Papers 62, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- von Schlippenbach, Vanessa & Teichmann, Isabel, 2011. "The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains," 51st Annual Conference, Halle, Germany, September 28-30, 2011 114519, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
- Vanessa von Schlippenbach & Isabel Teichmann, 2011. "The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1120, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Kourandi, Frago & Vettas, Nikolaos, 2010. "Endogenous Spatial Differentiation with Vertical Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 7948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vickner, Steven S. & Davies, Stephen P. & Fulton, Joan R. & Vantreese, Valerie L., 2000. "Estimating Market Power And Pricing Conduct For Private-Label And National Brands In A Product-Differentiated Oligopoly: The Case Of A Frozen Vegetable Market," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 31(02), July.
More about this item
KeywordsVertical relationships; differentiation;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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