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The Balance of Power between Producers and Retailers ; a Differentiation model

  • Marie-Laure Allain

This paper argues that the balance of power between producers and retailers depends on the relative degrees of differentiation at the two levels of the vertical structure. We propose an extension of Hotelling's model in which two producers, competing in prices with horizontally differentiated products, face two horizontally differentiated retailers also competing in prices. We study the setting of producers' and retailers' margins. We show that when retailers are more differentiated than producers, they dominate the relationship and their margin is higher than producers'.

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Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.

Volume (Year): 68 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 359-370

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Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_683_0359
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm

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  1. Katz, Michael L., 1989. "Vertical contractual relations," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 655-721 Elsevier.
  2. Greg Shaffer, 1991. "Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 120-135, Spring.
  3. Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, 1988. ""Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 221-234, Summer.
  4. Mills, David E, 1995. "Why Retailers Sell Private Labels," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 509-28, Fall.
  5. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn.
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