A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers
In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence input and output market prices. We show via an example that both these prices increase under a decreasing returns technology while the contrary holds when the technology is constant.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2007|
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- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2006. "Competition in successive markets : entry and mergers," CORE Discussion Papers 2006097, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1993.
"Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation,"
Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM
9308, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, 09.
- Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1995. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-40, CIRANO.
- Jean J. GABSZEWICZ & Didier, LAUSSEL & Tanguy, VAN YPERSELE & S, ZANAJ, 2007.
"Market Games and Successive Oligopolies,"
Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques)
2007009, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & LAUSSEL, Didier & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy & ZANAJ, Skerlilajda, . "Market games in successive oligopolies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2516, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & LAUSSEL, Didier & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007. "Market games and successive oligopolies," CORE Discussion Papers 2007010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean Gabszewicz & Didier Laussel & Tanguy Van Ypersele & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2008. "Market games and successive oligopolies," CREA Discussion Paper Series 08-05, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
- Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
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