Bidding to Lose? Auctions with Resale
After an auction, a losing bidder can purchase the prize from the winner. We show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation, and acquire the prize in the aftermarket: a strong bidder may be in a better bargaining position in the aftermarket if her rival won at a relatively low price. So it can be common knowledge that, in equilibrium, a weak bidder will win the auction and, even without uncertainty about relative valuations, resale will take place. (Furthermore, the result is robust to the addition of bidding costs.) And the possibility of reselling to a strong bidder attracts weak bidders to participate in the auction, and raises the seller's revenue. We explore how the seller can manipulate the conditions under which wealth-constrained bidders can finance their bids in order to induce a resale-equilibrium which raises the auction price.
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 2004|
|Date of revision:||01 Nov 2006|
|Publication status:||Published in RAND Journal of Economics, 2007, 38(4), 1090-1112|
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