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Duopoly with Both Ruin and Entry

Author

Listed:
  • Robert W. Rosenthal
  • Richard H. Spady

Abstract

Duopoly is modeled here as a prisoner's dilemma repeated in continuous time. Firms wish to maximize discounted flows of dividend payments, which are paid when capitalization levels permit. A firm is ruined when its capitalization falls below zero, but each ruined firm is immediately replaced by a new entrant. Attempting to ruin a rival is not necessarily an attractive strategy here, since the postentry game against the new rival may be a less favorable one. On the other hand, firms that are close to ruin have little to lose by playing aggressively and, hence, are attractive targets of aggression themselves. Equilibria are constricted that reflect these considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert W. Rosenthal & Richard H. Spady, 1989. "Duopoly with Both Ruin and Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(4), pages 834-851, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:22:y:1989:i:4:p:834-51
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    Cited by:

    1. Jun, Byoung & Vives, Xavier, 2001. "Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 2899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón & and Yosuke, 2011. "Oligopolistic Equilibrium and Financial Constraints," Working Papers 547, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Jun, Byoung & Vives, Xavier, 2004. "Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 249-281, June.

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