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La tariffazione dell'accesso nelle telecomunicazioni: principi economici e interventi regolatori in alcuni paesi industrializzati

  • Carlo Cambini

    ()

  • Piercarlo Ravazzi

    ()

  • Tommaso Valletti

    ()

La presenza di un'impresa monopolista che controlla un input rilevante per altre imprese esclude la possibilità di lasciare alle sole forze di mercato la determinazione del suo prez-zo: l'alta probabilità di abusi da parte dell'impresa dominante, di possibili comportamenti predatori o di forme di chiusura dell'accesso impongono un intervento volto a regolarne il prezzo e ad impedire comportamenti anticompetitivi del proprietario della rete. Il proble-ma della regolamentazione del prezzo di interconnessione, sia tra reti fisse che tra reti fis-se e mobili, nasce dunque dall'esistenza di attività potenzialmente concorrenziali, la cui realizzazione dipende dalla possibilità di accesso a una attrezzatura essenziale (essential facility). Dopo una breve descrizione dei principali risultati teorici sulla regolamentazione dei prezzi di accesso, l'obiettivo del lavoro è quello di effettuare una sintesi critica dei principali metodi utilizzati nella pratica alla luce delle più recenti esperienze della Gran Bretagna, degli USA e dell'UE.

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File URL: http://servizi.sme.unito.it/icer_repec/RePEc/icr/wp2000/Cambini10.pdf
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Paper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 10-2000.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:icr:wpicer:10-2000
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  1. J. Gregory Sidak & William Baumol, 1994. "Toward Competition in Local Telephony," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 52984, 4.
  2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Ravazzi Piercarlo & Valletti Tommaso, 1999. "Le telecomunicazioni in Gran Bretagna," Politica economica - Journal of Economic Policy (PEJEP), Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 329-380.
  5. Robert G. Harris & C. Jeffrey Kraft, 1997. "Meddling Through: Regulating Local Telephone Competition in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
  6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, June.
  7. Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1997. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Industrial Organization 9701003, EconWPA.
  8. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, June.
  9. Armstrong, M. & Doyle, C. & Vickers, J., 1995. "The access pricing problem: a synthesis," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9532, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-56, November.
  11. Armstrong, M. & Doyle, C., 1994. "Access pricing, entry and the Baumol-Willig rule," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9422, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  12. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May.
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