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„Golden-Gans“-Effekt, Preisdiskriminierungsgefahr und die Regulierung von Netznutzungsentgelten

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  • Christoph Bier

    (Uni-Saarland - Center for the Study of Law and Economics)

  • Dieter Schmidtchen

    (Universität des Saarlandes)

Abstract

In dem Paper wird untersucht, wann ein vertikal integrierter Netzbetreiber einen Anreiz hat, durch Fordern hoher Netznutzungsentgelte den Wettbewerb im nachgelagerten Produktmarkt zu beschränken. Außerdem wird geprüft, ob und wie eine kostenorientierte Regulierung der Netznutzungsentgelte den Wettbewerb im nachgelagerten Produkt fördern kann. Es werden zwei Typen von Gleichgewichten identifiziert - markteintrittsverhindernde und markteintrittsermöglichende. Markteintrittsverhindernde Gleichgewichte existieren im unregulierten Spiel, wenn der vertikal integrierte Monopolist einen Kostenvorteil gegenüber Konkurrenten besitzt. Hat er dagegen einen Kostennachteil, dann fördert er den Markteintritt. Überraschenderweise gilt für beide Gleichgewichte, daß eine kostenorientierte Regulierung der Netznutzungsentgelte den Wettbewerb fördern kann aber nicht muß.

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  • Christoph Bier & Dieter Schmidtchen, "undated". "„Golden-Gans“-Effekt, Preisdiskriminierungsgefahr und die Regulierung von Netznutzungsentgelten," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1137, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    • Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2006-1-1137
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    Cited by:

    1. Schmidtchen, Dieter & Bier, Christoph, 2006. "Netznutzungsentgelte als Wettbewerbshindernis? Diskriminierungsanreize und Regulierung in liberalisierten Strommärkten: Eine spieltheoretische Analyse," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-05 [rev.], Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    2. Bier, Christoph & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2006. "Regulierung in vertikal verknüpften Märkten: Maximieren diskriminierungsfreie kostenorientierte Netznutzungsentgelte die gesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt?," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    3. Schmidtchen, Dieter & Bier, Christoph, 2006. "Netznutzungsentgelte als Wettbewerbshindernis? Diskriminierungsanreize und Regulierung in liberalisierten Strommärkten: Eine spieltheoretische Analyse," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    4. Dieter Schmidtchen & Christoph Bier, "undated". "Netznutzungsentgelte als Wettbewerbshindernis? Diskriminierungsanreize und Regulierung in liberalisierten Strommärkten – Eine spieltheoretische Analyse

      The Access Pricing Problem: Incentives      ," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1158, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    5. Christoph Bier & Dieter Schmidtchen, "undated". "Regulierung in vertikal verknüpften Märkten: Maximieren diskriminierungsfreie kostenorientierte Netznutzungsentgelte die gesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1138, Berkeley Electronic Press.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strommarkt; Netznutzungsentgelte; Preisdiskriminierung; „essential facility”; „raising rivals’ costs“; Regulierung;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L - Industrial Organization
    • L - Industrial Organization
    • L - Industrial Organization

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