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„Golden-Gans“-Effekt, Preisdiskriminierungsgefahr und die Regulierung von Netznutzungsentgelten

Author

Listed:
  • Christoph Bier

    (Uni-Saarland - Center for the Study of Law and Economics)

  • Dieter Schmidtchen

    (Universität des Saarlandes)

Abstract

In dem Paper wird untersucht, wann ein vertikal integrierter Netzbetreiber einen Anreiz hat, durch Fordern hoher Netznutzungsentgelte den Wettbewerb im nachgelagerten Produktmarkt zu beschränken. Außerdem wird geprüft, ob und wie eine kostenorientierte Regulierung der Netznutzungsentgelte den Wettbewerb im nachgelagerten Produkt fördern kann. Es werden zwei Typen von Gleichgewichten identifiziert - markteintrittsverhindernde und markteintrittsermöglichende. Markteintrittsverhindernde Gleichgewichte existieren im unregulierten Spiel, wenn der vertikal integrierte Monopolist einen Kostenvorteil gegenüber Konkurrenten besitzt. Hat er dagegen einen Kostennachteil, dann fördert er den Markteintritt. Überraschenderweise gilt für beide Gleichgewichte, daß eine kostenorientierte Regulierung der Netznutzungsentgelte den Wettbewerb fördern kann aber nicht muß.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Bier & Dieter Schmidtchen, "undated". "„Golden-Gans“-Effekt, Preisdiskriminierungsgefahr und die Regulierung von Netznutzungsentgelten," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1137, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2006-1-1137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strommarkt; Netznutzungsentgelte; Preisdiskriminierung; „essential facility”; „raising rivals’ costs“; Regulierung;

    JEL classification:

    • L - Industrial Organization
    • L - Industrial Organization
    • L - Industrial Organization

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