The Incentive to Discriminate by a Vertically-Integrated Regulated Firm: A Reply
In Weisman (1995), I construct a model to investigate the incentives of a vertically-integrated regulated firm to discriminate against downstream rivals. This model suggests that the RBOCs do not have the same incentives to discriminate as AT&T prior to divestiture. Reiffen (1998) questions this and other conclusions. This reply addresses his claims. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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